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COMMENT
MONTANA'S DEATH PENALTY AFTER STATE
v. McKENZIE
Christian D. Tweeten
I. INTRODUCTION
No issue in American jurisprudence has so captured the pub-
lic's attention as the question of whether a state may constitution-
ally apply the death penalty for criminal offenses. The United
States Supreme Court has faced the issue twice in the last four
years,' and the Montana Supreme Court quite recently upheld
Montana's death penalty statute' in the case of State v. McKenzie.3
This note will review the substantive holdings of the recent death
penalty cases and will suggest statutory amendments to bring Mon-
tana's capital punishment statutes within the spirit as well as the
letter of the case law.
II. FURMAN V. GEORGIA
This 1972 per curiam opinion, with five separate concurrences
and four separate dissents, remains the landmark case on the appli-
cation of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause' to capital
punishment statutes. In Furman, the Supreme Court reversed and
vacated death sentences imposed on three defendants.5 Although
an in-depth analysis of Furman is beyond the scope of this note, a
short discussion of the opinions of the concurring Justices will aid
an understanding of Montana's legislative response to that decision.
The five concurring opinions each assert different theories for
finding the statutes in question unconstitutional, but they may be
roughly divided into three groups. The opinions of Justices Stewart
and White approached the cases from the narrowest viewpoint, and
the Court later adopted their opinions as the holding of the case.'
Under their analysis, the fatal flaw in the capital sentencing proce-
dures under consideration was that the discretion lodged in the
sentencing authority permitted capricious imposition of the death
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); and Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. 3001 (1976).
2. See note 49 infra.
3. State v. McKenzie, 33 St.Rptr. 1043 (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. Also reversed sub nom. Furman were Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1969)
and Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969).
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2923 n.15 (1976).
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sentence. As a result, the death penalty was "exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is im-
posed from the many cases in which it is not."7 In the absence of
consistent application of the sanction, these Justices held that the
death penalty violates the eighth amendment.
Justice Douglas' view of the problem is somewhat more com-
plex. Although he also focused on discretion as the crux of the ques-
tion, he reserved the larger question of the facial validity of capital
punishment. He found interwoven in the eighth amendment a con-
cept of equal protection," and argued that the constitutional failing
of the death penalty lies in the fact that unbridled discretion in the
sentencing authority
enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices
against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking in
political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular
minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more
protected position.'
Because the death penalty was arbitrarily and discriminatorily ap-
plied under the sentencing procedures then before the Court, in
Justice Douglas' view the statutes violated the eighth amendment.
The broadest view of capital punishment was taken by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Although their approaches differed, they
agreed that the death penalty may not constitutionally be imposed
under any circumstances.
Justice Brennan felt that a penalty, in order to conform to the
eighth amendment, must "comport with human dignity,"' 10 and
devised four principles" which together constitute a cumulative test
of the punishment's constitutional sufficiency. Justice Brennan's
conclusion is that some of the elements of the death penalty violate
all of these principles to some degree. On that basis he would hold
the death penalty unconstitutional on its face.
Justice Marshall devised a different four-prong test. In his
view, "a punishment may be deemed cruel and unusual for any one
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J. concurring).
8. Id. at 249 (Douglas, J. concurring).
9. Id. at 255.
10. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J. concurring).
11. Justice Brennan summarized his principles as follows:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it will be
inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than
some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment
violates the [eighth amendment].
Id. at 282.
[Vol. 38
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of four distinct reasons": 2 extreme pain, unusualness, excessiveness
in terms of legislative goals, and acceptability to popular sentiment.
Justice Marshall relied on the last two concepts, also present in
Justice Brennan's opinion,'3 to find that the death penalty consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment, regardless of the procedural
framework under which it is applied.
While there is no consensus among the concurring Justices as
to the particular constitutional shortcomings of the statutes in ques-
tion, it should be noted that all five Justices seem to rely at least in
part on the notion that unbridled discretion in the sentencing au-
thority inevitably leads to arbitrary or discriminatory application.
III. THE 1976 DEATH PENALTY CASES
In reaction to the Furman decision, the Congress of the United
States and the legislatures of at least 35 States enacted modified
death penalty statutes in attempts to come within the confines of
the Supreme Court's decision.'5 These reactions took two basic ap-
proaches.'6 A number of States perceived Furman as requiring that
a death penalty statute be mandatory and specific, reasoning that
the absence of any discretion would cure the constitutional defect
identified by Justices Stewart and White." Some States, however,
perceived Furman as attacking unbridled discretion rather than
discretion per se. These States carefully tailored their statutes to
control the discretion of the sentencing authority. This controlled
discretion resulted in application of the death penalty only where
certain unmitigated aggravating circumstances were present. In the
1976 death penalty cases, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the second group of statutes, while invalidating their mandatory
counterparts.
12. Id. at 330 (Marshall, J. concurring).
13. Id. at 277, 279 (Brennan, J. concurring).
14. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J. concurring); Id. at 309 (Stewart, J. concurring); Id. at 313
(White, J. concurring); Id. at 330 (Marshall, J. concurring); Id. at 277, 279 (Brennan, J.
concurring).
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973 (1976).
16. See Note, Florida's Legislative and Judicial Responses to Furman v. Georgia: An
Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA.ST.L.REv. 108 (1974); Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2928
(1976).
17. Justice Stewart set forth his reservation of the question of mandatory death penalty
statutes at some length. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1972) (Stewart, J.
concurring). Justice White focused on the infrequency of application of the death penalty as
the crux of his opinion. Id. at 311-14 (White, J. concurring). It would be easy to conclude from
these opinions that a statute providing a mandatory death sentence would be constitutionally
sufficient. In the 1976 death penalty cases, Justice White dissented in the Woodson and
Roberts cases, which invalidate mandatory death sentences, see infra at notes 39-47 and
accompanying discussion.
19771
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A. Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt
In Gregg v. Georgia,'8 and Jurek v. Texas,'9 and Proffitt v.
Florida,20 the Supreme Court fleshed out the bones of the Furman
decision by defining and limiting the statutory schemes under
which capital punishment could be applied. The notion that capital
punishment is per se impermissible was laid to rest initially in
Gregg,' and the later cases set out principles to which a capital
sentencing procedure must conform to satisfy the eighth amend-
ment.
In Gregg, the Court considered a two-stage trial procedure in
which the jury which rendered the verdict, or the judge in non-jury
cases, holds a separate sentencing hearing, with inquiry limited to
the question of whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death."2 The State may introduce evidence of aggravating circum-
stances, and the defendant may likewise attempt to establish miti-
gation. A sentence of death may be imposed only if the jury, or
judge, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one of ten statutorily
specified aggravating circumstances exists,2 and then only if the
sentencing authority elects to impose that sentence. 4 Georgia fur-
ther provides mandatory expedited review of all death sentences.25
Initially, the Court in Gregg undertook to define the meaning
of the decision in Furman. That decision, they held, "mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.""6
The Georgia system guarantees that the jury will receive adequate
information on the background of the defendant and the circum-
stances of the crime, and requires a finding of at least one specific
and narrowly defined aggravating circumstance before the death
sentence is imposed. It further requires the sentencing authority to
consider any mitigating factors offered by the defendant, and pro-
vides an additional check in the expedited mandatory appellate
review. The Supreme Court held that this system substantially min-
imizes the risk of the kind of arbitrary action condemned in
Furman.
18. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
19. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
20. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976).
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922-32 (1976).
22. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2503(b), 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1976).
23. Id. § 27-2534.1.
24. Id. § 27-3102.
25. Id. § 27-2537.
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976).
[Vol. 38
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The statutory scheme considered in Jurek27 presents interesting
variations on the Gregg theme. Texas includes within its range of
capital offenses a much smaller number of crimes. Under the Geor-
gia statute, anyone convicted of murder is forwarded automatically
to the capital sentencing procedure. 8 In Texas, only five narrowly
defined types of homicide carry a potential death sentence.29 Al-
though Texas also provides a two-stage trial in capital cases, the
jury function is somewhat different. Texas juries are given three
"statutory questions"3 which must all be answered in the affirma-
tive before the sentence of death will be imposed. Texas also pro-
vides mandatory expedited appellate review of a capital sentence.'
The Court found the Texas procedure constitutional. The post-
conviction hearing provides the necessary data to the jury, and the
jury's discretion is sufficiently focused and directed by the limited
class of capital offenses and the three-fold finding of fact which
must be made before a death sentence may be imposed.
Jurek also expanded on a concept first mentioned in Gregg.
While the Texas statute requires a finding of aggravation before
imposition of the death penalty, there is no explicit statutory au-
thorization for consideration of mitigation. The Court focused on
this problem, noting that "in order to meet the Eighth and Four-
27. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon) (Supp. 1976).
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101.
29. Capital murder is defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon)(1974):
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section
19.02(a)(1) of this code [intentional or knowing murder] and:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the
lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace
officer or fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of com-
mitting or attempting to commit kidnapping, burgulary, robbery, aggra-
vated rape, or arson;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to
escape from a penal institution; or
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders an-
other who is employed in the operation of the penal institution.
(b) An offense under this section is a capital felony.
30. The statutory questions are enumerated in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(b) (Vernon) (Supp. 1976):
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant which caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately, and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(f) (Vernon) (Supp. 1976).
19771
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teenth Amendments, a capital sentencing procedure must allow the
sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances."32 The
Court resolved the problem by resorting to the construction placed
on the Texas statute by the appellate courts of that State. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in Jurek v. State" that, in
its consideration of the likelihood that the defendant will be a con-
tinuing threat to society (the second statutory question), mitigating
factors are definitely relevant and may be introduced.3
4
Florida's procedure 35 provides still another example of a consti-
tutionally valid statutory scheme. It differs from the Georgia and
Texas statutes in two basic respects: Florida provides a list of spe-
cific mitigating circumstances which must be considered by the
sentencing authority, 6 and the jury determination of sentence in
Florida is advisory only, with final authority vested in the judge to
impose sentence.37 The Court gave little consideration to the statu-
tory list of mitigating circumstances, but dealt at some length with
the constitutional validity of judicial sentencing. The Court con-
cluded that, while jury sentencing has advantages and may be
desirable, it has never been held to be constitutionally required.38
As long as the sentencing authority, be it judge or jury, has suffi-
cient information and guidance to make a principled decision, the
requirements of Furman are satisfied.
B. Woodson and Roberts
In two other cases decided with the Gregg trilogy, statutes
which embody a different response to Furman are considered and
32. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2956 (1976).
33. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1975).
34. Id. at 939-40.
35. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1975).
36. The mitigating circumstances are listed as follows:
(6) Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or con-
sented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was sub-
stantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.
37. Id.
38. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966 (1976).
214 [Vol. 38
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rejected. Unlike the statutes considered above, the death penalty
statutes of North Carolina"9 and Louisiana" eliminated unbridled
discretion by eliminating (at least superficially) all discretion. The
Court's analysis of the constitutional failings of these statutes fur-
ther defines the Furman holding.
The statutory scheme considered in Woodson v. North Carolina
defined first degree murder and provided that the punishment for
the offense "shall be" death. The Court first noted that such a
system is inconsistent with contemporary values." More impor-
tantly, the Court further found that the statute failed to correct the
unbridled discretion attacked in Furman.2 The Court supported
this second rationale by reasoning that juries may decline to convict
a defendant of a capital offense solely to avoid the imposition of a
mandatory death sentence." The jury will still perform a discretion-
ary sentencing analysis, with its decision expressed in terms of guilt
or innocence rather than life or death. 5 This problem is exacerbated
by the impossibility of judicial review of such a "mandatory" sent-
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Supp. 1975) provides:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.-A murder which shall
be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture,
or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first
degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed
murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of
not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison.
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1976) provides:
First degree murder:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great
bodily harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the
performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder
or is serving a life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm upon more than one person; or
(5) When the offender has a specific intent to commit murder and has
been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death.
41. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2983-90 (1976).
42. Id. at 2990-92.
43. Id. at 2990.
44. Id. at 2990-91.
45. North Carolina's mandatory death penalty provides no standards to guide the
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree murder-
ers shall live and which shall die. Id. at 2991.
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ence. The result is that mandatory statutes are as constitutionally
deficient as completely discretionary ones.
The same conclusion was reached in Roberts v. Louisiana.
Louisiana provided a system of responsive verdicts" under which
the jury was instructed on an enumerated list of lesser included
offenses, and could thereafter return a verdict of guilty of the offense
charged or of any of the included offenses, whether raised by the
evidence or not. Louisiana also offered a narrowed list of capital
homicides similar to that offered by the Texas statute.47 The Court
held that the primary failure of this system arose from its lack of
guidelines. The jury is given no principles on which to differentiate
the capital cases from the non-capital ones. Under such circumstan-
ces, there is no safeguard against arbitrary and capricious sentenc-
ing.
C. Principles of the Cases
The procedures held to be constitutionally valid in these cases
have several common elements. All provide for a bifurcated trial
with a separate evidentiary hearing on the question of sentencing.
All involve the jury, either primarily as the sentencing authority or
secondarily as an advisory body. All provide specific and narrowly
defined statutory guidelines employed by the sentencing authority
in making its determination. Finally, all provide mandatory, expe-
dited judicial review of trial court's specific findings which gave rise
to the death sentence. These decisions hold that some of these
characteristics are constitutionally mandated, while others are
not." Clearly, however, each is important in guaranteeing that the
death sentence will be imposed in a manner consistent with
Furman.
46. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 814(A) (Supp. 1976) provides in part:
The only responsive verdicts which may be rendered where the indictment charges
the following offenses are:
1. First degree murder:
Guilty.
Guilty of second degree murder.
Guilty of manslaughter.
Not guilty.
47. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon)(1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp.
1976). See text notes 29 and 40 supra.
48. It is clear that guidelines and information for the sentencing authority are require-
ments of constitutional stature. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935 (1976). See State v.
McKenzie, 33 St.Rptr. 1043, 1072-73 (1976)(Haswell, J., concurring). In Proffitt v. Florida,
96 S.Ct. 2960, 2967 (1976), the Court indicates that jury sentencing is desirable but not
constitutionally mandated.
[Vol. 38
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IV. STATE V. MCKENZIE
As part of its 1973 revision of the Montana Criminal Code, the
Montana legislature enacted death penalty statutes for two classes
of criminal offenses. 9 In the 1976 case of State v. McKenzie, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that those statutes, as enacted,"0
satisfy the requirements of Furman.
McKenzie was convicted of the offenses of aggravated kidnap-
ping and deliberate homicide in the death of a rural school teacher.
Under the provisions of Montana's sentencing procedure,5 the trial
court ordered a presentence investigation and report.52 The defen-
dant moved for mitigation, but the court denied the motion and
imposed the death penalty. 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana considered twenty-
five separate specifications of error submitted by the defendant,
49. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947)[hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 19471, § 94-5-105,
reads as follows:
Sentence of death for deliberate homicide.
(1) When a defendant is convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide, the court
shall impose a sentence of death in the following circumstances unless there are
mitigating circumstances:
(a) The deliberate homicide was committed by a person serving a sent-
ence of imprisonment in the state prison; or
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another deliberate homi-
cide; or
(c) The deliberate homicide was committed by means of torture; or
(d) The deliberate homicide was committed by a person lying in wait
or ambush; or
(e) The deliberate homicide was committed as a part of a scheme or
operation which, if completed, would result in the death of more than one
person.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) and regardless of circumstan-
ces, when a defendant is convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide under
subsection (1)(a) of section 94-5-102 [a knowing or purposeful homicide] in which
the victim was a peace officer killed while performing his duty the court shall
impose a sentence of death.
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-304, as enacted in 1973, read as follows:
Sentence of death for aggravated kidnapping. A court shall impose the sentence of
death following conviction of aggravated kidnapping if it finds that the victim is
dead as a result of the criminal conduct, unless there are mitigating circumstances.
This section was amended by Sec.1, ch. 126, L.1974, to delete "unless there are mitigating
circumstances."
50. The McKenzie case preceded the 1974 amendment, and was decided under the
statute as originally enacted. State v. McKenzie, 33 St.Rptr. 1043, 1049-50 (1976).
51. R.C.M. 1947, Title 95, Chapter 22.
52. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2204, provides, inter alia, the contents of the report:
[Tihe probation officer shall promptly inquire into the characteristics, circum-
stances, needs, and potentialities of the defendant; his criminal record and social
history; the circumstances of the offense; the time the defendant has been in deten-
tion; and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the community. . . .
53. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2212, establishes that the judge rather than the jury is the
sentencing authority in Montana.
9
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including an attack on the constitutionality of Montana's death
penalty provisions.
In addressing the death penalty issue, the court noted that
Gregg required information and guidance for the sentencing author-
ity to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentencing.54 However, the
court first addressed the problem of judicial sentencing, holding, as
the United States Supreme Court did in Proffitt, that sentencing by
a jury is not a constitutional requirement.
The court then dealt with the substantive sufficiency of the
Montana system, noting that Montana, like Texas, directs the dis-
cretion of the sentencing authority by restricting the number of
offenses for which the death sentence may be imposed. Further,
information for the sentencing authority is provided by the presen-
tence investigation and report, and the appropriateness of the sen-
tence and its legality are subject to two levels of post-conviction
review.5 In sum, the court held that Montana's capital sentencing
procedure was so similar to those found constitutional in the Gregg
trilogy that it too was constitutionally sufficient.
As the concurring opinion of Justice Haswell points out, how-
ever, the majority in McKenzie inadequately explains the precise
application of the Gregg test to Montana's procedure. The concur-
ring opinion attempted to supply the deficiency. Justice Haswell
read Gregg as establishing three criteria which must be met by a
death penalty statute: specific statutory aggravating circumstances,
separate review of mitigation, and prompt judicial review." Ad-
dressing the first criterion, Justice Haswell found that the narrow
limitation of the categories of capital offenses essentially requires
that a statutory aggravating circumstance be found.57 Further, the
Montana statute requires consideration of mitigating circumstances
and of the particular circumstances of each offense and defendant
in the presentence report. 58 In addition, Justice Haswell noted that
a defendant may seek a hearing to present additional testimony on
the question of mitigation.59 Finally, the sentence review and appeal
provisions guarantee the availability of prompt judicial review. He
concluded that the Montana system "affords defendant the
procedural safeguards necessary to protect his substantive right to
be sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice." 0
54. State v. McKenzie, 33 St.Rptr. 1043, 1057 (1976).
55. R.C.M. 1947, Title 95, Chapters 24 and 25.
56. State v. McKenzie, 33 St. Rptr. 1043, 1972-73 (1976)(Haswell, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 1072.
58. Id. at 1073.
59. See infra at note 63 and accompanying discussion.
60. State v. McKenzie, 33 St.Rptr. 1043, 1073 (1976)(Haswell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 38
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Justice Haswell's concurrence presents a cogent argument in
favor of the Montana scheme, but his analysis overlooks some of the
flaws in the Montana system. Initially, it is doubtful that the statu-
torily narrow range of capital crimes is sufficient by itself to provide
guidance to the sentencing authority. The Texas scheme upheld in
Jurek, on which the majority so heavily relies, requires an additional
finding of aggravation in the jury answers to the statutory questions,
although the constitutional significance of the additional findings is
not made clear by the Jurek opinion.
Further, the statutory authority for a defendant to request a
hearing to present evidence of mitigation is unclear. The Montana
Criminal Code prior to 1967 contained such an explicit authoriza-
tion,"' but the statutes were repealed in the general revision of the
criminal code. Thus, though McKenzie was in fact accorded such
an opportunity, his right was not statutorily based. Justice Haswell
failed to cite any authority for his position in that regard. The
Montana judicial review provisions may be extensive, but they are
not mandatory and expedited, as are the provisions of the Georgia,
Texas, and Florida laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite Justice Haswell's attempt to clarify the status of Mon-
tana's capital punishment statutes, it remains uncertain whether
the statutes will pass constitutional muster. The amendment of the
death penalty provision of the aggravated kidnapping statute fol-
lowing the McKenzie case,6" making the death penalty mandatory
for certain offenses within that statute, renders that portion of the
death penalty scheme highly susceptible to constitutional attack
under the Woodson and Roberts cases. However, even if the Mon-
tana approach to capital punishment is found to be valid, Montana
should consider changes in its statutes which will recognize the
concerns, expressed by Justice Brennan in Furman, that the most
severe and final of all criminal sanctions should be imposed only
under a procedural framework which recognizes the uniqueness of
that sanction.63 Such a framework should include the jury in the
sentencing procedure in at least an advisory capacity, since the jury
can play a vital role in maintaining a link between the penal system
and contemporary community values." It should also provide the
defendant with a statutorily guaranteed right to a hearing at which
61. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-7813, 94-7814, repealed Sec.2, ch. 196, L. 1967. See Kuhl v.
District Court, 139 Mont. 536, 366 P.2d 347 (1961).
62. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-105.
63. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
64. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1977]
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he can present evidence of mitigating circumstances. The presen-
tence investigation and report cannot alone guarantee that the
defendant will have sufficient opportunity to establish mitigation.
Finally, the Montana system should provide mandatory, expedited
review of capital sentences to provide a quick and sure determina-
tion of the legality and appropriateness of the sentence. Without
safeguards such as these, the spirit of the Furman decision, which
recognizes that the most unique of sanctions requires a unique pro-
cedural framework, cannot be fully satisfied. 5
65. At this writing, two bills to modify Montana's approach to the capitol punishment
problem have been introduced in the 45th Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana.
Senate Bill No. 149, introduced at the request of the Montana Board of Crime Control, would
adopt an approach similar to the Florida statutes discussed at notes 35-38 supra. The bill
would require a post-conviction hearing to consider enumerated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. It would require the trial judge to make written findings of fact in support of
his sentence, and would provide mandatory expedited appellate review.
Senate Bill No. 214 would provide a procedure similar to the scheme ruled constitutional
in Jurek v. Texas, note 1 supra. See discussion notes 27-34. The bill would provide a manda-
tory post-conviction hearing before the jury, for consideration of the Texas statutory ques-
tions. Mitigation is not explicitly mentioned, but the Texas Supreme Court read mitigation
into a similar statute (see p. 214 & note 33 supra), and Montana's Supreme Court would
probably do likewise. The bill requires no written findings by the jury, but it does provide
mandatory expedited appellate review.
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